DAWSON WILLIAMSON ARCHITECTS

Proposed Development of Existing Site

at

Vale Works
25 Morley Lane
Milnsbridge
Huddersfield
HD3 4NS

CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES STATEMENT
Demolition of existing industrial / office buildings & construction of new building containing 18 No residential apartments (C3) along with associated external works to form off street car parking and ancillary facilities.

Revisions
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1.0 **Introduction**

This document has been prepared at the requested of the Planning Department in order to compliment the application previously submitted to Kirklees Council.

It is clear within Planning Policy Statement 1 (PPS1) that a key objective for new developments should be that they create safe and accessible environments where crime and disorder or fear of crime does not undermine quality of life or community cohesion.

The development has been designed to ensure that crime prevention is an integral consideration within the proposed scheme.

It is intended that this document demonstrate how crime prevention measures have been considered in the design of the proposal and how the design reflects the attributes of safe, sustainable places set out in Safer Places - the Planning System and Crime Prevention 2003 (ODPM / Home Office).

2.0 **Relevant Guidance & Legislation**

Building Regulations Approved Document Part Q, Security in Dwellings

ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) Secured by Design

British Standards

BS EN 356	Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing & classification of resistance against manual attack [2000]
BS 3621	Thief resistant lock assembly. Key egress [2007+A2:2012]
BS 8621	Thief resistant lock assembly. Keyless egress [2007+A2:2012]
BS 10621	Thief resistant dual-mode lock assembly [2007+A2:2012]

Publicly available specifications

PAS 24	Enhanced security performance requirements for door sets and windows in the UK. External door sets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk [2012]
PAS 3621	Multipoint locking assemblies. Keyed egress. Performance requirements & test methods [2011]
PAS 8621	Multipoint locking assemblies. Keyless egress. Performance requirements & test methods [2011]
PAS 10621	Multipoint locking assemblies. Dual mode egress. Performance requirements & test methods [2011]

3.0 **Safer Places - The Planning System and Crime Prevention**

The general attributes of safer communities listed within the document 'Safer Places - The Planning System and Crime Prevention' have been used as a series of headings, with comments marked in grey italic and addressed individually below:

3.1 **Access and movement**

"Places with well-defined routes, spaces & entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security"

Any access or service routes must not generate vulnerability to the rear of any premises (such as rear access footpaths).

Routes must not provide potential offenders with unnoticed access to potential targets or multiple escape routes.

Service access to the proposed building is obtained using the same route as all other access.
No vehicular access is proposed to the rear of the building.

All routes must be well defined so as not to undermine private or defensible space.

The number and nature of all connections must be considered.

The extent of public routes are well-defined, in order that they are clearly distinguishable from (and do not encroach upon) private space.

Routes for different users should be integrated and not segregated from each other.

The adjacent existing use shares a vehicular access route with the proposed new building.
This shared route is to be upgraded and retained within the proposed works.

All proposed routes must be safe to use at any time of the day or night.

All users must be able to understand which routes they use.

All routes proposed must be necessary and lead to places where people want to go.

The proposed site layout is simple, such that all users can understand possible routes to be used, whether day or night.

It must be easy to understand how to travel through an area.

It is considered that the simplicity of the site layout will mean that it is easy to understand how to travel through the external areas.

Routes must be designed to maximise the opportunity for natural surveillance.

Routes should be straight and wide without blind spots where potential offenders could be hidden.

Routes must not become a focus for anti -social behaviour.

Further comments are made in relation to natural surveillance within the later areas of this document, entitled "Surveillance".
Natural surveillance of all external routes is possible from both the proposed building, and existing adjacent areas.
Internal communal areas are designed in such a way to avoid long, thin, corridors, and dead ends.
Surveillance of internal communal areas is possible from one floor to that above or below.

Where street lighting is to be provided, this must be to the locally adopted standard.

No street lighting is proposed within the works.

3.2 **Structure**

"Places that are laid out so that crime is discouraged and different uses do not cause conflict"

The types of building must be selected and designed with security in mind.
All 'uses' in an area must be compatible with each other and potential conflicts must be identified and resolved within the design.

The proposed scheme houses a development of residential apartments.
This typology is deemed to be appropriate development for the site, given the use mix of existing buildings within the local area, and the position of the proposed building on the site itself.

Vehicle parking should be within the curtilage of the building it serves and be over looked.
Where this is not possible, car parking provision must be located very close to the building(s) they serve and again be well overlooked.

All vehicular parking is within the curtilage of the proposed building, and is overlooked from several vantage points (not least of which is approximately 50% of the apartments within the proposed building).

The layout of the development must be appropriate for the identified crime risk.
All public open space (POS) must be clearly defined and serve a purpose. It must support an appropriate level of legitimate activity.

No large public open spaces are proposed within the scheme.
All public spaces have an assigned use, primarily for parking or refuse / cycle storage.

Any open space that has become associated with anti-social behaviour must be redesigned to eliminate its continued future use as a venue for behaviour of this kind.

We are unaware of any specific adjacent external areas that have become associated with anti-social behaviour.

Consideration should be given to the redevelopment, removal or re-use of buildings and spaces that historically have proven vulnerable to crime.

Canal-side areas have historically been vulnerable to crime.
In positioning the proposed building close to the southern boundary of the site, and adjacent to the canal, it is hoped that the development of external adjacent areas and natural surveillance of this area will reduce vulnerability within this area.

Buildings should be orientated to maximise natural surveillance.

The positioning of the proposed building within the site is a by-product of several considerations.
Although the building has been positioned on the site in order to maximise natural light and amenity for residents, regard has also been given to natural surveillance; both of external surroundings, and of the building from external areas.
In this regard all external areas adjacent to proposed elevations can be viewed from public areas (e.g. the canal-side footpath at the south, the elevated public highway to the south-west) or from publicly accessible areas (e.g. proposed car park area at the north and route to the entrance at the west).
Similarly, windows are housed within all elevations; in order that natural surveillance can be made of all adjacent external areas from within.

3.3 **Surveillance**

"Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked"

Habitable rooms with an increased number of windows should overlook the street and other public spaces.

All habitable rooms proposed within the scheme house windows overlooking parking area, public footpaths, and the public highway beyond.

Well-lit spaces are crucial to reducing the fear of crime and should be sensitive to the needs of residents and users.
Lighting should be used to ensure good natural surveillance is available during the hours of darkness.
Open and bright spaces reduce the number of potential hiding places and reduce the fear of crime.

Low level and downward pointing external lighting is proposed on the external faces of the building, and along public and private external routes.

Surveillance should not be relied upon as the sole strategy for tackling crime and disorder.
Offenders should not be able to travel to and from locations without fear of being seen.
Buildings and spaces should be designed to allow for all round surveillance.
Blank walls and recesses should be avoided.

Surveillance of external areas is possible from all elevations of the proposed building.
Particularly large windows from communal areas are proposed adjacent to external areas most at risk from loitering and public nuisance at the east of the building.

Criminal activity should attract the attention of onlookers.
Elevations of a building benefit from the surveillance provided by onlookers.

Given the position of the proposed building within the site, all elevations of the building can be viewed from external public areas. This is particularly the case in relation to the canal-facing elevations of the south and east.

Where in- curtilage vehicle parking is not provided, vehicle parking should be located in areas where surveillance is plentiful and where the provision is close to owner's homes.

This is not applicable. All parking is within the curtilage of the proposed building.

CCTV may be introduced as a means of improving surveillance, but not as an alternative to getting the design right in the first place. An unmonitored CCTV system delivers no response to activities and is of little value.

Given the necessity of monitoring if any value is to be gained from CCTV, this is not proposed within the scheme.

3.4 **Ownership**

"Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community"

All space (i.e. public, semi-public, semi-private or private) must be clearly defined and adequately protected in terms of its use and ownership.
It must be clear where one type of space ends and another begins.
Given the simple nature of the site layout, and the fact that the majority of the site is public, or semi-public external space; it is clear where external public space ends and private space begins.

The creation of defensible space empowers residents to take control of areas close to their home and is an important principle that should be used extensively throughout any development.
External private areas are proposed to both the north and south facing elevations. These are enclosed in nature, and intended to appear as if "carved" out of the larger built form.
This approach will enable the creation of naturally defensible spaces.

Anti-social behaviour can flourish in communal space if people do not identify the area as belonging to them as natural self-policing does not occur.
Communal spaces within the interior of the proposed building are laid out in such a way so as to avoid long corridors and dead ends. Given the number of private apartments accessed from each communal area, and the "pairing" of apartments sitting opposite one another, it is hoped that ownership of different sections of the communal area by directly adjacent apartments will take place.

Private space should not be easily accessible to people who have no right to be there.
Proposed external private areas are limited to balcony spaces at upper floor levels, and small elevated external terraces at ground floor level. At upper floor levels, these private external space are inaccessible due to their height, and at the ground floor level, they are designed in such a way to increase their level of privacy (see above comments).

Low fencing, hedges and bushes can be used as demarcation of space where ultimate security is not an aim.
Low fencing is proposed to the refuse storage area.
This is in order to allow external surveillance, and discourage anti-social behaviour within.

High fencing that actively impedes access is most appropriate in places that are vulnerable to crime, such as the rear of dwellings.
Sensitive placement and appropriate selection of physical barriers such as gates, fences, walls and hedges, creates safe places that are also attractive.
High, visibly permeable fencing is proposed to the cycle storage area.
This is in order to provide increased security in this corner of the site, whilst maintaining visibility and overlooking throughout.

Landscaping can be used to make places safer as well as more attractive provided it does not restrict natural surveillance. To ensure that this principle is adhered to, continued maintenance of the overall height of bushes and the canopies of trees is necessary.
Following completion of the works, it is proposed that a management company will be responsible for both management and upkeep of the external planting, as well as maintenance of the external and communal areas.

Most people respond to changes in paving, surface texture, materials, colour, landscaping and signage. These measures help to differentiate between public and private space for the benefit of all users.
Differences between public, semi-public, semi-private, and private space are demarked through differentiation in material finishes, etc… Please refer to Section 6.0 Conclusion for further information.

3.5 **Physical protection**

"Places that include necessary and well-designed security features"

Effective security creates a delay to the intruder and therefore the robustness of doors and windows should not be overlooked as a means of defeating the criminal.
The target hardening principles and standards utilised by Secured by Design (www.securedbydesign.com) should be used to inform the applicant on the nature of security hardware currently available.
Designing-in effective physical security from the outset is cheaper, simpler, and more successful than retrospectively attempting to install measures later.
Local development control officers may be asked to impose formal planning conditions requiring the use of security enhanced doors and windows such as those referred to in Secured by Design.
You should always consider these products as an extremely effective, image enhancing and cost effective way of creating physical security.

It is proposed that external doors and windows be in accordance with Secured by Design principles and standards.

Internal Apartment Entrance Doors are to house several ironmongery items intended to increase security.

These include both 5-lever dead lock and cylinder lock, or alternatively a three-point locking system within the leading edge of the door. In addition, items such as door viewers / spyholes, increased level security hinges (with pins), and door chains / restrictors are to be used.

In multi occupancy buildings, a combination audio-visual access control system should be installed.
In multi occupancy buildings, access control should be used on each level to further restrict movement into private areas.

Fob / keycode entry systems, and an audio access control telephone system are to be installed at the communal external door.

Retrospective measures such as barbed wire and rotary spike treatments can be avoided by the adoption of designing out crime principles during the design stage of a new development.

Such measures are not proposed within the works.

3.6 **Activity**

"Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times"

The public realm should be designed to be enjoyed by different cultural or age groups at the same time. This can be done by providing a range of complementary activities and designing the environment to minimise conflict.
The creation of places that become devoid of activity at certain times of the day or night, whilst remaining accessible to offenders, should be avoided.
As many law abiding people as possible should be attracted to make use of space in the public realm.
It is intended that the proposed apartments will appeal to a wide range of people.

Decisions about the appropriate level and type of activity must be made with the local context in mind.
The scheme contains residential development. Given the level of residential development within the surrounding area, this is deemed an appropriate use.
The level and type of activity is deemed appropriate for the town centre location.

Criminals should not be able to go about their business unnoticed.
As referred to within Section 5.0, surveillance of external areas is possible from both within the proposed building, and external areas to the site.

Certain types of places, such as public squares and town centres, thrive on attracting a large number of people. The key is to create a high quality environment and alternative opportunities and activities for those who might otherwise become involved in crime or disorder.
No external areas of this nature are proposed within the scheme.

A town centre residential population brings activity, surveillance and ownership and should be encouraged. However bars and clubs are best located away from these areas.
The proposed works are residential apartments, and it is anticipated that such a use will assist in wider ownership and surveillance of this area.
Although the site is close to the centre of Milnsbridge; it is considered reasonably far away from any bars, clubs, or other social gathering spaces (particularly those that are used late in the evenings) so as not to suffer from problems as a result.
The placement of a residential development adjacent to the existing canal is intended to bring increased activity, surveillance and ownership to this public space.

Local shopping areas should be designed to provide a safe environment whilst limiting the scope for anti-social behaviour.
No shopping areas are proposed within the works.

3.7 **Management and maintenance**

"Places that are designed with management in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future"

Anyone with 'ownership' of space whether public, semi-public, communal or private must be aware of their personal maintenance responsibilities.

Maintenance responsibilities will largely fall under the remit of an ongoing management company, and future inhabitants will be made aware of their personal maintenance responsibilities.
Given that the scheme consists of private dwellings, maintenance by individual owners of their personal property will be more likely.

Places must be tidy, attractive and well cared for as this indicates that crime and disorder will not be tolerated and generates a feeling of safety in the user.

The use of a management company is to ensure that the communal and external areas of the site will remain tidy, attractive and well cared for.

All signs of any previous disorder or signs of neglect such as broken windows, litter, abandoned vehicles or graffiti, must be removed promptly.

The site is to be entirely cleared prior to the works.

Whilst getting the physical design and build of areas right is paramount, management and maintenance will remain important factors in the creation of safer places.

A management company is to be employed to care for the communal and external areas of the proposed works.

Responsibilities of care should be agreed at the earliest opportunity during the development process and should be documented to prevent future disagreements between the relevant parties.

Responsibilities in relation to care and management of the site and building going forward will be included within sales / rental / leasing agreements.

When an organised human presence, such as security staff, vehicle parking attendants, concierges or gardeners is part of the overall management strategy, care should be taken to ensure their sustainability in the long-term.

A management company is to be employed to care for the communal and external areas of the proposed works. As is common within residential apartment developments, each apartment will contribute to the running costs of the management company via a service charge, and the management company will arrange required services (including communal cleaning, landscape maintenance, etc…). In this way, the specific cleaning or landscaping company can change over time, but the responsibility remains with the overall management company.

The provision of secure storage for maintenance equipment is required as they are both a target for theft and a tool for crime.

It is proposed that aforementioned external maintenance companies (e.g. communal area Cleaning Company, Landscape Management Company, etc…) will bring their own tolls when they visit the site. In this way, very little maintenance equipment (and certainly nothing of high value) will be stored on site.

4.0 **Building Regulations Approved Document Part Q, Security in Dwellings**

Building Regulations Approved Document Part Q1 applies to easily accessible doors and windows that provide access in any of the following circumstances:

a. into a dwelling from outside
b. into parts of a building containing flats from outside
c. into a flat from the common parts of the building.

It is intended that doors and windows proposed within the works will resist physical attack by a possible burglar by being both sufficiently robust, and fitted with appropriate hardware.

Section 1: Doors

General

All easily accessible door sets (including communal entrance door sets) that provide access into a dwelling or into a building containing a dwelling should be secure door sets as follows.

External Doors

Proposed secure (external) door sets should be manufactured to a design that has been shown by test to meet the security requirements of British Standards publication PAS 24:2012, or other similar and approved standard.
These include: STS 201 Issue 5:2013, LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 2, STS 202 Issue 3:2011 Burglary Rating 2, or LPS 2081 Issue 1:2015 Security Rating B.

Apartment Entrance Doors

The main doors for entering the dwellings are to have a door viewer installed.
No other means exist to see callers, such as clear glass within the door or a window next to the door set.
This door set is also to house a door chain or door limiter.

Installation of aforementioned door sets

It is proposed that door frames are mechanically fixed to the structure of the building in accordance with the manufacturer's installation instructions.
Internal timber-framed / metal-framed party walls are to incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall and accessing the locking system.
This resilient layer should be timber sheathing at least 9mm thick or a similar resilient material. The resilient layer should be to the full height of the door and 600mm either side of the door set.

Section 2: Windows

General

Ground Floor Level and other easily accessible windows (including easily accessible roof lights) should be secure windows as follows.

Design

Windows should be made to a design that has been shown by test to meet the security requirements of British Standards publication PAS 24:2012, or other approved standard providing similar or improved performance.
These include: STS 204 Issue 3:2012, LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1, and LPS 2081 Issue 1:2015 Security Rating A.

Installation of secure windows

It is proposed that window frames should be mechanically fixed to the structure of the building in accordance with the manufacturer's installation instructions.

5.0 **ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) Secured by Design**

It is intended that proposed external windows and doors are to be tested and certified as compliant with the principles and standards utilised within the Secured by Design scheme.

6.0 **Conclusion**

The nature of the development means that the layout of the building has been designed to ensure clear definition, differentiation & separation of public / semi-public space from either external private space, or residential apartments.

As a visitor progresses through the site, they will pass through a series of spaces that move from the entirely public, through semi-public, semi-private, to the private. The junctions between these spaces are marked by secure barriers, doors, fencing, external gates, etc… and reinforced by changes in finishes and signage.

We would consider the following classification of spaces:

Public	External Areas, Car Parking
Semi-Public	Refuse Storage Area, Cycles Storage Area,
Semi-Private	Internal Communal Areas
Private	Individual Apartment, External Balcony

The proposed apartments have been designed to ensure that there is CCTV surveillance of public / semi-public spaces which will be designed by the Project Mechanical & Electrical Engineer.

The pedestrian & vehicle access to the site has been designed to suit existing patterns in the local environment.

The development will be constructed to exceed the requirements of the Building Regulations Part Q in relation to security.