Co-op Academy Smithies Moor

Leeds Old Road, Heckmondwike, WF16 9BB

Crime Impact Statement

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Document Register

This report is based on the information contained in the documents listed below:

Reference	Title	Revision
SRP1128-ONE-ZZ-XX-D-L-0004	Access & Security Strategy	P03
SRP1128-ONE-ZZ-XX-D-L-0013	General Arrangement External Works Plan Sheet 1 of 2	P02
SRP1128-ONE-ZZ-XX-D-L-0014	General Arrangement External Works Plan Sheet 2 of 2	P02

Table of Contents

1 Executive Summary

This Crime Impact Statement (CIS) describes how the redevelopment of Co-op Academy Smithies Moor primary school will achieve an appropriate and proportionate standard of security, and minimise the risk of crime whilst maximising safety for staff, pupils and visitors. The document recognises the potential risks associated with the proposed use and location, and details the approach taken to:

- Minimise security risk to, and preserve the safety of, future building users.
- Reduce potential future impact on policing resources.
- Reduce the adverse effects of crime and disorder on the wider community.

The CIS appraises the development proposals with regards to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, as advocated by the UK Police Secured by Design (SBD) guidance, and summarises the approach to adoption of physical and technical security measures.

The preparation of this CIS also took into consideration advice provided by the local police Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) which has been adopted as appropriate.

2 About the Author

Gareth Hulmes of Toren Consulting produced this CIS. Gareth is a former DOCO with Greater Manchester Police, and has experience of producing Crime Impact Statements for a range of building types. In addition, he is:

1. A Chartered Security Professional (CSyP) and Fellow of The Security Institute (FSyI), both of which require annual recorded completion of 36 hours (minimum) of relevant Continued Professional Development (CPD) activity. Gareth's CSyP listing can be viewed here.
2. A Secured by Design (SBD) Fully Licensed Consultant, enabling him to provide associated SBD guidance and advice at all stages of a development from planning through to completion. Gareth's SBD listing can be viewed here.
3. A Registered Independent Security Consultant (RISC) with the Association of Security Consultants (ASC). Gareth's listing can be viewed here.

3 Introduction

3.1 Background

Bowmer + Kirkland appointed Toren Consulting to prepare a Crime Impact Statement (CIS) to accompany the planning application for the proposed redevelopment of Co-op Academy Smithies Moor primary school.

The planning application pertains to the demolition of existing buildings on the site and erection of a new single form entry primary school with associated external amenity space, parking areas, cycle storage facilities and landscaping.

3.2 Site Location and Access



Figure 01 Photoview location plan (Napper Architects)

The site is situated southeast of Leeds Old Road, in Heckmondwike, West Yorkshire, approximately 1.5km south of Birstall, 2km northwest of Batley and 2km north of Heckmodwike town centre. It adjoins the site of Fairfield School which caters for children aged 3-19 with a wide range of complex needs, as well as publicly accessible playing fields to the south.

The immediate area is predominantly residential, characterised by terraces, semi-detached and detached housing which line the surrounding roads of Leeds Old Road, Priestley Avenue, Leeside Road and White Lee Road.

The wider area comprises further residential uses in addition to farmland (Barley Fields and Popeley Farms to the north) and large-format retail outlets (e.g. trade suppliers and furniture outlets).

3.3 The Existing Site

The site currently comprises a primary school with associated external amenity space, parking areas, cycle storage and landscaping.

The general arrangement of the site together with level changes and landscaping means that there are some areas of concealment. This can hamper natural and formal surveillance (e.g. by site users and video surveillance respectively) and have the potential to allow unauthorised or antisocial behavior (ASB) to go unnoticed.

Figure 02 Examples of accessible areas of the site concealed from general view

The existing school facility is fully enclosed by perimeter boundary treatments and gates at a height of approximately 2.4m. These treatments comprise a combination of weldmesh and railings, with manually lockable gates. These boundary styles permit good natural surveillance and are generally favoured for school sites over alternatives such as palisade fencing (which often has inherent security vulnerabilities) or walls (which obscure activity from view).


Figure 03 Weldmesh (left) and railing (right) outer site boundary treatments

Sub-divisional boundaries comprising timber closed boarded fencing with matching gates, approximately 1.8m in height, and weldmesh fencing approximately 1.5m in height provide compartmentation within the site, defining natural access control and enabling parts of the grounds to be closed to access whilst others are open.


Figure 04 Examples of sub-divisional boundary treatments

A single recessed area of the building envelope had been apparently retrospectively gated. Whilst the reasons for this are not known, retrofitting of gates to building recesses is often in order to prevent ASB or reduce vulnerability of concealed entrance points to burglary. Singane indicating video surveillance were also observed, though corresponding cameras could not be seen.


Figure 05 Gated recess to southwest elevation

3.4 Playing Fields

John Curwen Academy Playing Fields (used by Birstall Victoria ARLFC) adjoin the site to the south. The existing school site incorporates direct access to these fields, via a lockable 2.4m high gate.

The abutting of publicly accessible fields to a school site can present a vulnerability owing to the reduced levels of natural surveillance in such locations, increasing the value of robust boundary treatments and other preventive and deterrent measures. This can be made even more acute where trees and other features present either areas of concealment or act as aids to climbing.

With the exception of a small amount of graffiti to a shipping container storage unit, the playing fields, and in particular the dense vegetation separating the two pitches, appeared free from signs of ASB (e.g. alcohol containers and drug paraphernalia) sometimes associated with such out of sight locations.

The fields were well maintained, and were seemingly well-used, with the presence of several desire lines through the vegetation indicating regular walking routes through the space.


Figure 06 Desire lines through vegetation between playing fields (left) and view south over fields towards residential properties (right)

3.5 Local Area

Leeds Old Road fronts the site, with numerous houses to the north overlooking the route in addition to the school site frontage itself. This arrangement provides a degree of activity mix (to the benefit of both uses) and sources of natural surveillance which can act as a deterrent to unauthorised behaviour (including when the school is closed).

Figure 07 Views northeast along Leeds Old Road

There were several instances of security orientated signage in the vicinity. This could be either in response to previous incidents or purely preventative.

Figure 08 Security-related signage in the local area

The entrance to Fairfield School is located along White Lee Road, incorporating several features which together assert the transition from public to private space (e.g. boundary fencing, signage and wayfinding and changes in surface). This aids territorial definition and can serve to deter unauthorised access owing to the increased perceived likelihood of being challenged.

Figure 09 Views from White Lee Road of Fairfield School entrances

Whilst the local area was generally well kept and free from criminal damage, there were isolated instances of fly tipping and litter accumulation. These were limited to areas between fencing and paths, which had apparently fallen to neglect. Positioning boundaries up to the public footpath in such situations can avoid the creation of such spaces and therefore reduce the opportunity for these situations to arise.

Figure 10 Examples of litter and fly-tipping in undergrowth

4 The Proposed Development

This section of the Crime Impact Statement provides an overview of the development and explains features that have been considered to reduce the risk of crime.

The development will provide a new single form entry primary school with associated external amenity space, parking areas, cycle storage facilities and landscaping. The proposals are described overleaf.



Figure 07 Proposed Security & Access Strategy Site Plan (One-Environments)

Feature	Description
General Arrangement	Vehicles will access the site via gates in the location of the existing vehicular entrance threshold off Leeds Old Road, providing access into the main car park. Two gated pedestrian routes into the site are provided off Leeds Old Road; one adjacent to the vehicular access point, and one further south at the western corner of the site. This is to provide flexible access and cater for those approaching the site for north and south. Outside of peak arrival and departure times, these gates will be secured and access managed by staff. The remainder of the site frontage will comprise play and amenity space. The school building will be positioned to the south east of the site, with the main building entrance accessible directly off the car park.
Boundaries	The site will be enclosed by a combination of new and retained fencing and gates. All perimeter fencing and gates will comprise 2.4m high weldmesh. This boundary style will benefit the development owing to its visual permeability, supporting natural surveillance into and out of the site. Pedestrian and vehicular gates leading into the car park will be capable of operating on access control, with intercom linked to the school reception.
School Building	The building form will be free from recesses, therefore providing no areas of concealment where ASB could manifest. The building will have a logical layout whereby entrants pass through a single point of access, via reception. Fenestration products will be aluminium systems, which are described further from a physical security perspective in section 9.
Shared Use	Birstall Victoria ARLFC will have use of the changing facilities to the south east of the building. The layout has been designed such that this portion of the building can be accessed and secured independently (i.e. by sub-divisional fencing, and a single lockable internal door), therefore maintaining security to the rest of the school building and site.
Car Park	Parking will be provided within the site boundary. The car park is positioned to benefit from natural surveillance from both Leeds Old Road and the school reception. Separation of pedestrian and vehicular routes has been provided.
Landscaping	New landscaping works will be introduced. These will support an appropriate degree of natural surveillance and support the natural access control and wayfinding strategy.
Cycle Parking	Cycle parking will be provided in the form of sheltered cycle stands (e.g. Sheffield or similar) located within the site curtilage, adjacent to the car park and northern pedestrian entrance gate.

5 Security and Town Planning

A requirement for developers to consider and to design against crime and terrorism is described in several sections of The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 2024 and the Kirklees Local Plan: Strategy and Policies (adopted 2019).

5.1 The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 2024

The NPPF 2024 contains the following paragraphs, relevant to security:

Planning policies and decisions should promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements by:

1. *Anticipating and addressing possible malicious threats and natural hazards, especially in locations where large numbers of people are expected to congregate. Policies for relevant areas (such as town centre and regeneration frameworks), and the layout and design of developments, should be informed by the most up-to-date information available from the police and other agencies about the nature of potential threats and their implications. This includes appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security.*
2. *Recognising and supporting development required for operational defence and security purposes, and ensuring that operational sites are not affected adversely by the impact of other development proposed in the area.*

5.2 Kirklees Local Plan: Strategy and Policies (adopted 2019)

Kirklees' local plan includes a strategic objective relating to crime prevention, referred to within various policies, which all proposals should be consistent with:

Strategic Objective

5) Tackle inequality and give all residents the opportunity of a healthy lifestyle, free from crime and to achieve their potential in work and education.

Furthermore, the following paragraphs and policies include separate references to crime prevention:

Policy LP24 (Design)

e) the risk of crime is minimised by enhanced security, and the promotion of well-defined routes, overlooked streets and places, high levels of activity, and well-designed security features.

11.15

Good design can secure safer environments and help prevent crime through a range of measures including encouraging formal and informal surveillance, controlling movement within developments and providing a clear delineation between public and private space.

11.17

Secured by Design sets out detailed considerations for how the design of new build homes can help reduce the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime.

6 Designing Out Crime Consultation

The SQSS and Bowmer + Kirkland met with the The Police Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) during the production of this CIS, on 10/06/25. The DOCO was highly supportive of the proposals, and their feedback is summarised below:

1. The DOCO welcomed the early, pre-planning engagement and agreed with Toren's assessment that the area showed no signs of criminal damage or graffiti, and that the site's natural surveillance and activity mix contributed positively to crime prevention.
2. The proposed 2.4m high weld mesh perimeter fencing was supported by the DOCO, offering good visibility, fewer footholds (e.g. than the existing railings), and overall appropriate site security.
3. The DOCO engaged constructively with the site plan and was reassured by the consideration given to car park positioning, lighting, and vegetation to maintain natural surveillance.
4. The proposed inclusion of features such as laminated glass, robust doorsets with multipoint locking systems , and access control at the main entrance were seen as positive features.
5. The provision of cycle shelters was considered appropriate for the location and context, and enclosed bin storage within the boundary was well-received. The DOCO noted the low incidence of bike theft in the area.
6. The DOCO noted no significant security concerns related to the site, and agreed that more isolated issues such as off-road bikes and isolated fire-setting incidents could be effectively mitigated through good design and site management.

7 Crime Analysis

7.1 Policing Area

The development is located within the Batley and Spen policing area, which falls under the jurisdiction of West Yorkshire Police. This area is identified below.

Figure 12 Batley and Spen policing area (police.uk)

There were no current, stated policing priorities for the Batley and Spen policing area evident on police.uk.

7.2 Crime Statistics

The figure below describes the volume of crime and disorder in the Batley and Spen policing area for the last 3 years (from June 2022 to April 2025).



Figure 13 Crime recorded within the Batley and Spen policing area (from June 2022 to April 2025)

Furthermore, www.police.uk describes the crime rate in Batley and Spen (in the year ending September 2024) as:

- About the same as the average crime rate across similar areas.
- Lower than average for the West Yorkshire area.

In addition, crime rates in the quarter ending September 2024 (when compared with the corresponding quarter in 2023) were:

- Down in Kirklees.
- Down in the West Yorkshire force area.

7.3 Methodology

Security risks comprise a combination of threats, vulnerabilities and impacts. A security risk depends on the **likelihood** of threat actors (e.g. criminals, terrorists, fixated people) exploiting a vulnerability (i.e. a gap or weakness in security) to achieve their objective, thereby causing an **impact** (i.e. the amount of harm, from loss of life to financial and reputational loss).

Toren Consulting believes that security risk is subjective and unquantifiable, so we:

1. Assess security risk and its components as 'High', 'Medium' and 'Low'
2. Agreed risks and mitigations that match our clients' value judgements

7.3.1 Likelihood

Security threat is a product of the **capability and intent** of threat actors with regard to the target.

When we talk about the **likelihood** of a security threat we mean "**The probability that threat actors will succeed in making a credible attempt to attack**".

Likelihood	Description
Very Low	The event may occur in exceptional circumstances. The threat source lacks motivation and capability and is very unlikely to be successful. The implemented security controls will entirely mitigate the vulnerabilities.
Low	The event could occur in limited circumstances. The threat source lacks motivation or capability and is unlikely to be successful. The implemented security controls should significantly mitigate the vulnerabilities.
Moderate	The event could occur in some circumstances. The threat actor is motivated and capable and could be successful in an attack. The implemented security controls could mitigate the vulnerabilities.
High	The event is likely to occur in most circumstances. The threat actor is motivated and capable and is very likely to be successful. The implemented security controls do very little to mitigate the vulnerability.
Very High	The event is expected to occur in most circumstances. The threat actor is highly motivated and capable and will be successful. Security controls have either not been put in place or are extremely ineffective.

7.3.2 Impact

A successful security threat incident usually has many **different types of impacts** that could include death or serious injury, psychological harm, financial loss, damage to property, etc. When we talk about the **impact** of a security threat we mean "**the amount of harm caused by a successful attack**".

For the purposes of this Planning Security Strategy, we have adopted a standardised impact methodology based on knowledge of the proposed use.

Impact	Description
Very Low	No injuries. Financial loss of less than £100,000. No reputational harm. No lasting disruption to the use of the building. Very minor damage to assets.
Low	Injuries requiring first aid treatment. Loss or costs greater than £100,000. Minor reputational harm. Disruption to the use of the building for less than 1 day. Minor damage to assets.
Moderate	Injuries requiring medical treatment and counselling. Loss or costs greater than £500,000. Moderate reputational harm. Disruption to the use of the building for more than 1 day. Moderate damage to assets.
High	A single death or multiple serious injuries requiring extensive treatment. Loss or costs greater than £1,000,000. Major reputational harm. Disruption to the use of the building for greater than 7 days. Major damage to assets.
Very High	Multiple deaths. Loss or costs greater than £5,000,000. Catastrophic reputational harm. Disruption to the use of the building for greater than 30 days. Catastrophic damage to assets.

7.3.3 Classification

IIn order to assess a security risk, we combine the **likelihood** and **impact** of the associated security event to provide an overall security **risk rating**.

The following security risk matrix illustrates how, for example, an event with a very high likelihood but a very low impact would be assigned an overall security risk rating of Medium.



Figure 11 Security Risk Matrix (Toren Consulting)

7.4 Risk Calculation

This section applies the methodology described in section 7.3 to evaluate the likelihood, impact and associated risk of a range of offence types considered relevant to the proposals. Offence types not considered to be relevant to the proposed development, by virtue of the proposed use and the facilities provided, are not considered. Table entries have been listed in descending order based on Risk Rating.

Offence	Description	Relevance to Proposals	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Rating
Arson	Arson is the act of deliberately setting fire to property. Arson is more likely to affect external areas of the property.	Although crimes of arson are relatively low in volume, they tend to be targeted and there are many historic examples of such incidents affecting school properties. However, due to the school being fully enclosed by a 2.4m high perimeter boundary treatment and the distancing of features such as bin stores from the building, the likelihood of arson towards the school is considered to be very low.	Very Low	Very High	**Medium**
Targeted Theft	Targeted theft is more likely to be planned, including reconnaissance of the property, and to be carried out by skilled and experienced attackers with access to a wide range of mechanical, electrical and electronic tools and even vehicles and willingness to harm occupants if required. Targeted theft typically occurs outside of the building's main operating hours.	Open source research revealed no incidents of theft (i.e. burglary) targeted at the existing schools, or nearby schools, in recent years. The DOCO also provided no reports of burglary relevant to the existing school. Nonetheless, the proposed development may be attractive based on perceived aggregation of valuable assets (e.g. portable IT hardware) or other specialist equipment. Proportionate protection can be addressed with tactical specification of building components, and the management/storage of assets.	Low	Moderate	**Low**
Violence and Sexual Offences	Violence offences include physical assault and threats of violence whether or not there is any injury. Sexual offences include sexual assault, unlawful sexual activity (which can involve consenting participants), grooming and indecent exposure.	During March 2025, there were 10 violent and sexual offences recorded within half a mile radius of the site (www.streetcheck.co.uk). Police.uk indicates violence and/or sexual offences are the most prevalent form of recorded crime in the Batley and Spen area, with incidents in close proximity to the site appearing mostly associated with residential streets.	Moderate	Low	**Low**
Opportunist Theft	Opportunist theft takes place when a criminal in a legitimate location knows or assumes the presence of a portable valuable item and can readily observe a security vulnerability.	Opportunist theft is typically carried out by those with legitimate access, and in the case of the proposed development is most likely to involve assets such as student, staff and rugby club user belongings, and items of school property. Access control and the ability to secure individual spaces will minimise the likelihood of such incidents.	Moderate	Low	**Low**
Antisocial Behaviour (ASB)	Antisocial behaviour is defined as someone acting in a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress including intimidation, verbal abuse or threats; harassment; persistent noise and rowdy behaviour; vandalism, or graffiti.	During March 2025, there were six ASB offences recorded within half a mile radius of the site (www.streetcheck.co.uk). Due to the site being inaccessible out of hours, and benefiting from good levels of legitimate activity and associated surveillance during operating hours, it's considered the likelihood of ASB manifesting is low.	Low	Low	**Very Low**
Criminal Damage	Criminal damage is the intentional and malicious damage to property.	Review of recent Street View data and discussions with the police DOCO did not reveal any significant evidence of criminal damage in close proximity to the school. Furthermore, only three instance of criminal damage were recorded during March 2025 within half a mile radius of the site (www.streetcheck.co.uk).	Low	Low	**Very Low**
Cycle Theft	A person commits bicycle theft if they take a bicycle for their own or another's use without permission.	The volume of cycle theft over the preceding three years is negligible. Basic security provisions (such as providing cycle stands compatible with users' cycle locks) should serve to minimise the likelihood of such incidents occurring.	Very Low	Very Low	Negligible

8 Security Concepts

The following security concepts have been considered to guide the adoption of security controls to ensure that they:

1) Are appropriate and proportionate;
2) Represent good value for the applicant; and
3) Complement the development design intent.

8.1 CRAVED

This crime prevention concept sets out the attributes of assets most likely to be targeted by thieves and therefore helps to identify areas of development that warrant further protective measures. Only one of the attributes needs to be present to make an asset attractive, but the more attributes that apply, the greater the attractiveness of the asset.

The attributes comprise:

- **C**oncealable
- **R**emovable
- **A**vailable
- **V**aluable
- **E**njoyable
- **D**isposable

8.2 JASPAR

This concept is designed to assist in the identification of appropriate and proportionate counter-terrorism security controls but is equally applicable to security controls in general.

JASPAR is based on the premise that security controls must be shown to satisfy each of the guiding attributes, otherwise the proposed control may be considered inappropriate and/or disproportionate.

The attributes comprise:

- **J**ustifiable
- **A**chievable
- **S**ustainable
- **P**ractical
- **A**ffordable
- **R**easonable

8.3 Deter, Detect, Delay

Deter, Detect and Delay (in addition to Mitigate and Respond) are principles advocated by the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) on the premise that security controls can only be effective if the various types of controls proposed at each layer of defence are considered complementary to each other during the formulation of a solution. The principles comprise:

Deter - Controls designed to discourage, frustrate and/or displace an attack.

Detect - Controls designed to identify and verify an attack, then trigger a capable response.

Delay - The use of performance-rated physical security controls to prolong an attack.

Mitigate - Measures are taken to limit the impact of an attack, thereby reducing risk.

Respond - Intervention is designed to curtail an attack and/or apprehend the attackers.

Critical to this methodology is an understanding of the layers of security applicable to a development (i.e. the concentric points at which security controls may be deployed). Typical layers are summarised in the diagram below, and apply to the following controls:

- Electronic Security Controls including intruder detection, video surveillance and access control to alert responders to threats
- Physical Security Controls including fences, vehicle barriers, walls, doors and safes to deny or delay threat actors reaching their targets
- Operational Security Controls including procedures, monitoring, patrolling and response.

Figure 12 Layering of security measures (Toren Consulting)

An effective combination of security controls is one that provides a greater physical delay to the attacker than the sum of the time to detect the attack and for a response to arrive.

8.4 STAVE

This methodology, devised by the Building Research Establishment (BRE), describes the principles which underpin the selection of appropriate physical security standards for use in mitigating risk; specifically in providing the element of 'delay'. STAVE is based on the premise that performance standards applied to physical security controls must adhere to the following traits:

Scope - The control type must fall within the scope of the standard selected.

Threat - The standard should be threat-based (as opposed to design-based).

Available - The standard must be available from the issuing organisation.

Verifiable - It must be possible to verify a control's approval to the standard.

Easy - The standard can be easily understood and interpreted by a range of disciplines.

Key to applying the STAVE methodology is an understanding of what a given security control is required to do (i.e. its performance attributes). Factors which influence this are listed below.

Threat Actor Characterisation

Different standards use various parameters in order to provide a range of performance options, but in general, they usually consider the following to varying extents:

- Training and experience e.g. novice and knowledgeable
- Toolsets, e.g. concealed hand tools, readily available tools, specialist tools, heavy tools
- Total attack time, e.g. 1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 60 minutes

Therefore, products are typically specified to standards which consider an appropriate combination of threat actor capability and attack duration, e.g. 'a novice attack for 10 minutes using basic hand tools' or 'a knowledgeable attack for 3 minutes using heavy construction tools'.

Overt and Covert Attacks

Attack resistance standards can also, explicitly or implicitly, categorise threats into overt and covert. Overt threat actors are relatively unconcerned about noise and damage leading to detection, whilst covert threats prefer to avoid detection.

Overt attack test standards therefore often allow a lot of noise to be generated, as the toolsets that they permit allow for a greater amount of damage to the building fabric. Covert attack test standards assume that the attacker will rely on stealth, technical ability and minimising obvious damage so as to not advertise the compromise.

8.5 Routine Activity Theory (RAT)

This theory considers crime likely to occur when three principle variables are true, those being:

1. The presence of a capable/motivated offender;
2. The presence of a target (or asset); and
3. The absence of a deterring presence.

Prevention of crime therefore requires the removal of one or more of these variables. For example, targets can be made less suitable (relocated, or more protected) and capable guardians (such as staff, management personnel or security guards) can be installed.

Figure 13 RAT Theory (Toren Consulting)

9 Security Controls

The following section describes the intended approach to mitigating security risks, which has been communicated to the DOCO who confirmed their support for the proposed measures. This approach will be developed as the project progresses.

Note: Images used are for indicative/illustrative purposes only, and intended to communicate the associated design principle.

9.1 Design & Layout

The design and layout of the proposals have been developed with consideration to safety and security. The features adopted can be categorised according to the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED); a theory shown to support a reduction in crime and the fear of crime and advocated by the UK Police Secured by Design initiative. An objective of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for offenders to commit crimes, and simultaneously promote positive interaction with the environment. The CPTED principles, and alignment of the proposals, are summarised below:



9.1.1 Natural Access Control

Natural access control guides how people enter and leave a space through the placement of entrances, exits, fences, landscaping and lighting. It can decrease opportunities for crime by denying criminals access to potential targets and creating a perception of risk for offenders.

Scheme Alignment: **The proposals include a singular access point for vehicles, and designated access points for pupils and parents. These points and the associated internal roads and paths (together with the landscape design) define movement routes between site entrance points and the main school entrance. The occasional use of the changing facilities by the rugby club will be facilitated by a lockable gate off the playing fields, with access within the school site limited by internal sub-divisional fencelines.**

9.1.2 Natural Surveillance

Natural surveillance guides the placement of features such as windows, lighting and landscaping. These features affect how much can be seen by occupants and passersby. Criminals are less likely to attempt a crime if they are at risk of being observed and we are likely to feel safer when we can be seen.

Scheme Alignment: **The building has been oriented such that the northerly-facing classrooms and reception are able to overlook the foreground to the site, which contains the majority of external amenity spaces along with the car park, cycle store and site entrance points. Furthermore, the selection of weldmesh fencing to the site perimeter will support both inward and outward natural surveillance from/to Leeds Old Road. This is to the benefit of the site, pedestrians and the opposing residential properties.**

9.1.3 Territorial Reinforcement

The definition of space can create a territorial effect that may deter potential offenders. Examples include defined property lines and clear distinctions between private and public spaces. Reinforcement can be created using landscaping, pavement designs, gateway treatments, signage and fences.

Scheme Alignment: **The territorial definition of the site will be reinforced by the physical perimeter boundary treatment, together with entrance features such as signage, distinct changes in surface materials and landscaping treatments. This will help to communicate the transition from public highway to semi-private space within the site. This will be supplemented at a building level, where internal boundary fencing (to a height of between 1.8m and 2.4m) and wayfinding will also communicate the private aspects of the site.**

9.1.4 Maintenance

A well-maintained development creates a sense of guardianship and deters criminals.

Scheme Alignment: **The maintenance of the buildings and external areas will be subject to robust arrangements once the school is occupied. However, certain steps will be taken to minimise the burden on operational maintenance routines. These include the tactical use of soft/hard landscaping and the specification of vegetation with desirable growth characteristics (i.e. where tree canopies have clear stem heights of at least 2m, and low level vegetation is maintained at no more than 1m).**

9.1.5 Activity Support

Criminal acts can be discouraged in public spaces when we encourage activities in those spaces by legitimate users.

Scheme Alignment: **The proposed building will facilitate use by the rugby club outside of normal school operating hours. This provides opportunity for the site to benefit from legitimate activity (and the associated natural surveillance that brings) over an extended period not necessarily limited to typical hours of school operations. Furthermore, the amount and proximity of residential properties will provide additional activity mix to the benefit of the development.**

9.1.6 Defensible Space

'Defensible Space' is a term used to describe an environment where certain physical characteristics (e.g. boundary definitions, materiality, signage) allow legitimate users to assert influence, ownership and control to ensure their security, where misuse of space is more likely to be deterred.

Scheme Alignment: **'Defensible Space' is most valuable where the space to be protected borders publicly accessible space, as this is where the assertion of ownership and control (and the deterrent effect that creates) is most effective. The proposed school boundary treatment to Leeds Old Road will directly abut the footpath, and clearly demarcate the extent of privately owned and managed space. This is recommended, as examples of litter accumulation and fly-tipping were witnessed at nearby locations where such boundaries were set back from public space, creating areas of ambiguous ownership.**

9.2 Landscaping & Boundaries

To enable good lines of sight and foster natural surveillance, the landscaping scheme will be specified such that tree canopies will generally be maintainable at a height of no lower than 2m and shrubs at a maximum height of 1m. In addition, landscaping will support the natural access control strategy (refer to 9.1.1) whilst enabling the school to exert ownership over the site frontage to Leeds Old Road.

Outer boundary treatments are intended to both clearly demarcate the transition from public to private space, and provide an appropriate degree of resistance/deterrence to climbing. This will be achieved through use of a 2.4m high weldmesh fence system, the design of which will be free of horizontal members and apertures that can be used as footholds. This type of system is also highly supportive of natural surveillance, owing to its high degree of visual permeability.

Internal boundary treatments of the same style will be placed to limit access along the sides of the building, therefore containing activity to designated areas only. This will also complement the separation of space at the rear of the building to enable use of the changing facilities by the rugby club.

Care will be taken to ensure that hinge and locking points to the associated gates do not provide convenient climbing opportunities (e.g. through design or shrouding).

9.3 Lighting

The development will benefit from a comprehensive lighting scheme comprising column and building mounted lights to illuminate key locations of the site and building facade (e.g. car park and building entrance points). This is consistent with guidance issued by Secured by Design, which also promotes the importance of good uniformity of lighting to external movement networks.

Uniformity (minimum/average lux) of circa 0.25 is generally encouraged to avoid the creation of 'dark spots' which can undermine an individual's ability to identify potential hazards. To ensure this, the lighting scheme shall be developed to meet the requirements of the relevant British Standards by a competent lighting designer.

9.4 Physical Security

9.4.1 Building Envelope

Whilst the risk of opportunist and targeted theft has been determined as low, several security features will be provided to the building's construction to provide a degree of resistance to basic attempts at forced entry, which is considered proportionate to the assessed risk and appropriate for the proposed use.

Pedestrian doors will incorporate features designed to provide resistance to forced entry, such as multi-point locking and Euro-profile cylinders rated to TS007 (3 star) or equivalent.

Glazing at easily accessible levels (e.g. within 2.4m from external ground level) will include laminated glass rated to EN 356 P1A with retention measures (such as security glazing tape) which will serve to frustrate the unauthorised removal of glazing units.

Alternatively, doorsets may be sought to PAS 24 which typically include features akin to those described above.

9.4.2 Internal Features

Internal store rooms and teaching spaces will be key-lockable enabling their contents to be secured when not in use. Following occupation, the school is advised to develop a strategy for the routine securing of high value CRAVED items within such spaces, to further reduce their vulnerability to theft.

9.4.3 External Features

External areas where physical security is a consideration include cycle and refuse stores and perimeter boundary treatments.

The cycle store will comprise a series of cycle stands beneath a covered shelter, located within the site boundary and in a highly visible location. This is appropriate given the assessed level of risk, and will enable cycle users to secure both the wheels and frame of their cycle (using their own locking systems). The refuse store will be a lockable enclosure, also within the site boundary.

No security ratings are proposed for perimeter boundary treatments, which (subject to the features described in section 9.2) will provide an appropriate degree of deterrence to casual/opportunist access by virtue of their height and design.

9.5 Electronic Security Systems

9.5.1 Access Control Systems (ACS)

Electronic access control will be provided to the outer and inner main reception lobby doors. This will enable a school staff to maintain control over entry to the building.

The northern pedestrian gate and car park vehicular gate will also be incorporated into the ACS. This will support remote admittance of staff and visitors to the site outside of peak arrival and departure times.

Intercom stations will be required at each of the above locations (with the exception of the inner reception lobby door) for use by visitors needing to request access.

9.5.2 Video Surveillance Systems (VSS)

Fixed view video surveillance cameras will be strategically placed to provide coverage of:

- External areas of the site including amenity space, car park and cycle store, site entrance points;
- Building elevations.
- Key internal spaces such as the reception entrance lobby and primary circulation spaces.

The system is intended to allow local observation (i.e. from the reception office) and recording to enable post-incident investigation. It is not proposed that the system will include off-site monitoring, which is considered disproportionate to the level of risk.

9.5.3 Intruder Alarm

An intruder alarm system is proposed, and the detailed specification of this will be subject to input from the client and their insurers. The system shall be capable of at least detecting intrusion through external doors and windows (through a combination of door/window contacts and internal detectors) with the capability for external monitoring or keyholder response.

10 Conclusion

The proposed redevelopment of Co-op Academy Smithies Moor incorporates a proportionate and integrated approach to crime prevention and site security. This Crime Impact Statement (CIS) has set out how the design contributes to providing a safe, welcoming and well-managed environment for pupils, staff, and visitors.

The security strategy set out in this CIS has been developed with due regard to the relevant parts of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 2024 and the Kirklees Local Plan. These policies emphasise the importance of designing out crime and ensuring personal safety. The proposals respond to these requirements through a combination of environmental, physical and technical measures that are appropriate to the site's context and assessed risk level.

Overall, the measures proposed seek to reduce opportunities for crime and antisocial behaviour, support effective site management, and contribute to a development that promotes safety, community confidence, and sustainability. The approach has been shaped in consultation with the Police Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO), drawing on current Secured by Design (SBD) guidance.