



*Consultancy Ltd*

Security Risk Management

**BREEAM**

**Security Needs Assessment.**

**Blackmoorfoot Road Huddersfield.**



Image: KPP Architects

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30<sup>th</sup> October 2025

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BMF-KAB-ZZ-ZZ-RP-Y-REVE

# CONTENTS

## Section 1

### Introduction

- Purpose of the report..... 2**
- BREEAM Hea06 requirements ..... 3**
- Site location ..... 4**

## Section 2

### Security Needs Assessment

- Executive Summary ..... 5**
- Developed Theory ..... 6-7**
- Crime data ..... 8**
- Site visual audit ..... 9-10**
- Site audit ..... 11**
- Consultation ..... 12**
- General risks ..... 13**
- Site specific risks ..... 13**
- Identified Design Threats..... 14**
- Recommendations ..... 15 - 21**
- Other considerations ..... 22**

## Appendices

- Appendix A – Crime data
- Appendix B – Crime data
- Appendix C – Standards list
- Appendix D – Site information
- Appendix E – SQSS Credentials

# Section 1

## Introduction

### Purpose of the report

This report defines a Security Needs Assessment (SNA) completed by KABSEC Consultancy in support of the development of 14 new industrial units with associated office space, car parking and landscaping on site at:

**Blackmoorfoot Road,**

**Huddersfield.**

**HD4 5NU**

The SNA considers security threats to the proposed development and security vulnerabilities apparent in the architectural designs and proposed uses. The SNA follows a security design methodology to provide security recommendations that should be designed and specified in future project stages. These recommendations are specifically intended to mitigate security risks to the development, its users and the surrounding area.

The site-specific SNA includes the following:

1. A **virtual visual audit** of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development
2. Details of the formal **consultation with relevant stakeholders**, including the Police Design Out Crime Officer (DOCO) or Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) to obtain a summary of crime and disorder issues in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development.
3. **Identify risks** specific to both building and the proposed, likely, or potential user groups of the building and **propose recommendations for security improvements.**
4. Identify any **detrimental effect** the development may have on the existing community.

The purpose of the assessment is to inform stakeholder decision-making and allow the identification and evaluation of security recommendations and solutions.

**The content of this report may be deemed restricted or confidential.**

**This document should be dealt with in accordance with employer disclosure requirements.**

## BREEAM Hea 06 Security - Requirements

“A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent)”

**BREEAM** awards a point towards a development’s rating if an SNA is completed and recommendations from that report (this document) are implemented.

The aim of Hea 06 is to recognise and encourage effective measures to promote **Security of Site and Buildings**

*A credit for this element is achieved if:*

- 1. A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent). The purpose of the SNA will be to identify attributes of the proposal, site and surroundings which may influence the approach to security for the development.*
- 2. The SQSS develops a set of security controls and recommendations for incorporation into the proposals. Those controls and recommendations shall directly relate to the threats and assets identified in the preceding SNA.*
- 3. The controls and recommendations shall be incorporated into proposals and implemented in the as-built development. Any deviation from those controls and recommendations shall be justified and agreed with the SQSS.*

**Kevin Burrows of KABSEC Consultancy acted as SQSS for this Security Needs Assessment.**

**Kevin is listed as SABRE accredited by both the BRE and the Security Institute.**

**Kevin is listed as a fully licenced Secured by Design consultant, as shown at: [SBD Consultant](#).**

**Initial SNA requirements were completed on:**

**DATE – 25/3/2024**

**RIBA Stage – 2**

## Site Location



Image: Google maps

The proposed site is located within Park Valley area of Huddersfield an area incorporating many commercial units.

The site is located along Blackmoorfoot Road, approximately 4 miles southwest of Huddersfield town centre.

The major routes feeding the site are the A62 Manchester Road, about 1km away and the M62 motorway, around 5km from the site.

## Site Layout

The current plans show that the site will consist of 14 new industrial units. Each unit will have individual office space with dedicated or shared vehicle parking spaces, cycle and bin stores.



Image KPP Architects

Risk from neighbouring buildings is assessed to be 'low'. The nearest buildings are across the main road and behind the proposed development and none of the neighbours are identified as 'of increased risk'.

Where any potential for a higher risk site might be identified, this site is sufficiently separated from the wider environment, by way of both distance and by other buildings providing an additional layer of protection.

Proximity of higher risk sites were considered throughout this assessment (particularly under publicly accessible location criteria (PALS)).

# Section 2

## Security Needs Assessment

### Executive Summary

This assessment has been produced to assist with security provision for the development of a new industrial units with office space, car parking and landscaping.

The development is a new build on an existing site for B2 (General Industrial), and/or B8 Storage or Distribution use. The site is currently accessed from Blackmoorfoot Road at its junction with Standard Drive. The site has a proposed new access road further along Blackmoorfoot Road.

Site plans offer more informal surveillance opportunities both to and from neighbouring properties; with the possibility of higher vehicular traffic levels adding to passive surveillance prospects, this will undoubtedly improve observation levels to the new units.

Given both location and use of this redevelopment, a condensed area appraisal was also conducted (a crime pattern analysis in the immediate area of the development site, to ascertain if any anomalies are evident).

The security needs assessment relates to a 'shell and core' assessment. Features to improve security provision in the future are included and may be used as advisory comments within the assessment, but some physical protection elements and a level of access control are deemed essential within any category of fit out.

Since this is an instruction at **RIBA Stage 2**, the environmental visual study was completed online using Google Maps /Earth.

## Developed Theory.

The foremost theory used to reduce the likelihood of criminal activity within planning and construction disciplines is crime prevention through environmental design. (CPTED).

- 1. Physical protection** This is the application of physical security measures to prevent or deter unauthorised access
- 2. Surveillance opportunity** Ensuring there are multiple surveillance opportunities (natural, formal and informal) ensures the development is protected from casual intrusion and opportunist criminals.
- 3. Access Control** Both natural and man-made access control measures can be applied in this context to create single, clearly identifiable points of entry to the site or site buildings
- 4. Territoriality** This can be the actual definition or subconscious assertion that the development belongs, although not formally, to a legitimate user group.
- 5. Maintenance** Ensuring an area remains well-maintained in the future will reduce the likelihood of further ASB, loitering and criminality.

All five principles are considered within this assessment.


KABSEC Consultancy are proponents of the ISO 22341 standard, a document that has essentially taken ageing CPTED principles and modernised/updated to inform today's security need. The KABSEC assessment is again cognisant of ISO 22341 concepts with relevant interventions included.

Physical protection elements are designed to achieve, as a minimum, the principles of Secured by Design accreditation. Principles of the SABRE scheme is also considered, so where physical protection elements may be restricted, then adequate and appropriate mitigation is required to provide sufficient protection.

## Layering Security Measures

The effectiveness of security risk mitigation measures in combination is typically considered using a layered, or onion skin model comprising:

- Electronic security measures including intruder detection, video surveillance and access control to provide to alert responders to threats
- Physical security measures including fences, vehicle barriers, walls, doors and safes to deny or delay threat actors reaching their targets
- Operational security measures including procedures, risk assessment, monitoring, patrolling and response.



### 'Onion Ring' Model


In an urban setting, these layers are typically represented by:

- External Intrusion Detection Systems
- Boundary treatments and landscaping
- Video Surveillance
- Doors and Windows
- Internal Intruder Detection Systems
- Hold-up Alarm Systems (panic buttons)
- Refuge Areas
- Security guards, third-party security or police response

## Crime Data

The primary source of information is the Police.uk website – the **Huddersfield** neighbourhood area, West Yorkshire Police, was analysed to determine risk.

### [Huddersfield | Police.uk \(www.police.uk\)](http://www.police.uk)



Huddersfield Policing Neighbourhood

Where additional but relevant neighbourhood data is required, then the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and affiliated websites are used. All sites are fully audited Government controlled open source sites that allows members of the public and professionals alike to review recorded statistics in respect of chosen neighbourhoods.

These websites allow for a limited complexity of data trawls to be performed, but from available data, comparisons can be made against similar or adjacent areas.

For this site assessment, the postcode of **HD4 5NU** was used.

The relevant data statistics are shown in **Appendix A & B**

## Area Audit

### “A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development”

This report aims to identify both actual and potential vulnerabilities, to futureproof against the more likely future crime trends. All proposals are made to provide long term cost benefits to both landlord and/or tenants from physical protection elements.

The scope of this security needs assessment is limited to the shell and core elements of the building structure.

The proposed development of this site assimilates its surroundings and the proposed changes seek to redevelop the area with upgraded buildings. This is in keeping with the existing building designs in the wider area.

Development of the site is viewed a positive when assessing risk – security standards have improved, building methods are now far more resilient and updated aesthetics have been (academically) shown to impact on the subconscious of both user and offender.

Risk to users within any publicly accessible space in the vicinity is considered to be **low/medium**.

Risk to users within private areas would be reduced to **low**.

Risk to staff should be increased to **medium** upon approach to their place of work, particularly if on foot.

Identified risks form the basis for the design basis threats as detailed below.

## Site Audit

**The crime pattern analysis indicates that the main risks are:**

1. **Acquisitive crime**, particularly theft. Locations such as industrial/warehouse/logistics facilities, when developed and open to users, can generate crime if left unchecked. Users and their assets can provide opportunity to the motivated offender.
2. **Criminal damage or arson** where the buildings or surroundings are attacked. This is often an extension to ASB when left unchecked.
3. **Vehicle Crime** the area does suffer lower levels of this crime and this could be replicated in the vehicle parking areas around the site(s).

Violent and Sexual and Public Order offences recorded in the area are associated with the residential areas in the wider area.

Another important element for BREEAM accreditation is what effect the proposed development could have on the surrounding area, and how existing properties will interface with the development.

The development will add to activity in the area and is designed to complement surrounding properties.

In conclusion, the development is considered to enhance the area and proposed uses integrate successfully into both its immediate and wider surroundings without conflict.

**The proposed development will not produce any detrimental effect on this community.**

**It is considered highly likely the proposed will in fact enhance this community.**

This element of the BREEAM accreditation process can therefore be discharged, with the proposed development enhancing the area without negatively affecting surrounding properties, whilst also not being negatively affected by neighbouring properties.

## Consultation with relevant stakeholders

**“Formal consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the local ALO, CPDA & CTSA (as applicable), in order to obtain a summary of crime and disorder issues in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development”**

The Design Out Crime Officer (DOCO) for West Yorkshire Police has been contacted.

Telephone conversations followed which resulted in the DOCO requesting a copy of the SNA when completed. This was sent, with the following response received.

Re: Blackmoorfoot Road, Huddersfield.



**Thornton, Richard** <richard.thornton@westyorkshire.police.uk>  
To: [kevin@kabsecuk.com](mailto:kevin@kabsecuk.com)

[↩ Reply](#)
[↩ Reply All](#)
[→ Forward](#)
[⋮](#)

Tue 12/03/2024 08:35

Good morning Kevin

Thanks for sending this information through.

Having assessed the plans, they bear no resemblance to the planning applications which have previously been submitted for this land for housing. With that, do I take it that there is likely to be a new planning submission for the attached?

I would be more than happy to discuss this with you.

Kind regards

**Richard Thornton MSyI**  
Designing Out Crime Officer

**West Yorkshire Police**  
Kirklees Council Planning and Development Service  
PO Box 1720  
Huddersfield  
HD1 9EL

Tel - 101  
Council Offices - 01484 221000  
Mobile 07809 689519

The DOCO generally accepted security proposals included within this assessment in principle, although the DOCO reserved his right to amend when responding to a future planning application.

This DOCO has since left West Yorkshire, with no successor in place.

## General risks for site and user groups

Site user groups will generally be those tenants using the storage and logistics space.

Risk is heightened in publicly accessible areas.

As demonstrated by the crime pattern analysis, the proposed development location is in a **medium crime area**.

The **Huddersfield** neighbourhood has medium levels of recorded offences largely situated in the residential and town centre areas.

## Site specific risks

- Theft which could occur from industrial/warehouse/logistics units/offices.
- Criminal damage, or arson, against buildings and outbuildings.
- Vehicle crime – including theft of vehicles, cycles and motorbikes

## Identified Design Threats.

Attack Category	Description
<p><b>Opportunist Theft:</b> Opportunistic offending without physical force or violence.</p>	<p>A single adversary attempts to gain illicit access to the building without forced entry or violence. The attacker would not carry significant tools or use techniques which causes noise. The adversary is more likely to target users in the public realm upon their approach.</p>
<p><b>Targeted theft:</b>  Experienced forced entry using tools and/or violence.</p>	<p>Two or more experienced aggressors using concealable hand tools to attempt entry into the building. The attackers will be willing to generate some noise. Examples would include forced entry via a fire escape or roller shutter in order to access the respective unit/office and would almost certainly occur 'out of hours'.</p>
<p><b>Anti-Social or Public Order Acts (including criminal damage)</b> Remaining external to premises or legitimate access whereupon offender(s) engage in disruptive actions/threats.</p>	<p>Single or multiple offenders. Generally, by way of protest or disagreement, shouting obscenities, verbal threats etc. Littering, graffiti, fire raising etc. are more likely offences on estates such as this.</p>

## Recommendations for security improvements.

The following security recommendations are based on all available information. The proposed development of this site will increase levels of activity across the wider site. The proposed use provides a coherent, and continuous use of the space without significant change to overall site function, without impacting on other business.

Although the site has a 'low' crime designation the requirements listed are deemed commensurate to the wider risks within the Huddersfield area and incorporation within the build specification would allow claim to be made to support achievement of BREEAM security requirements. It should be noted the principles of the Secured by Design (SBD) accreditation scheme have been used to inform this assessment where SBD requires a minimum standard of installation is required, irrespective of crime risk.

The development is a redevelopment of an existing site and the developers should provide a minimum standard of security. A 'Category A' fit out should incorporate all standard elements whilst providing features to promote any additional future fit out.

As such, mandatory elements of the security need are **emphasised**.

The below requirements are generic across all buildings and will ensure that compliance is achieved.

The following requirements apply to the new building(s)

### **i) Physical Security - External Doors (Pedestrian doors)**

Any door which provides access into or out of the building must comply with either:-

- Loss Prevention Standard 1175 Security Rating 2 (LPS1175 SR2 {B3})
- Security Technical Standard 202 Burglary Rating 2 (STS 202 BR2)
- LPS 2081 Security Rating B (LPS 2081 SR B)
- BS EN 1627 Resistance Classification 3 (BS EN 1627 RC3)

### **Vehicular Door.**

Compliant doors are generally available where the area does not exceed 24m<sup>2</sup>.

If doors exceed the accepted maximum for compliance, then doors should be purchased from a manufacturer who manufactures security accredited door systems

### **MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS**

#### **ii) Windows**

Any openable window forming part of the commercial shell must, as a minimum requirement, comply with the PAS24 specification. Fixed units fall outside the scope of the PAS24 criteria. The PAS24 requirement relates to any window less than 3.5m from ground level and includes areas on upper floors that could be designated as 'easily accessible' (where the definition of easily accessible is specified in Building Regulations Approved Document Q).

### **MANDATORY**

#### **ii) Glazing units**

The recognised configuration is generally either toughened or laminated – annealed glass is not accepted.

The CPNI now recognises a laminated/laminated configuration for façade resilience, but risk at this location is very low. The primary objective of the glazing unit is now one of attack resistance.

One pane of each glazing unit (either below 3.5m or easily accessible upper floor) is to incorporate one piece of glass which achieves the BS EN 356 P1A resistance standard.

### **MANDATORY**

#### **iv) Access Control and Core Protection**

Each building should have an access control system. The requirement for the access control system is that it is designed and installed by a member of either the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes (see relevant information within the electronic security section below).

The development will be used by multiple businesses and the primary function of the access control is the control of trespassers who may be opportunist offenders.

The UL293 standard would normally be followed but given there are only a limited number of companies currently providing a product that achieves this specification, an access control system that is compliant with BSEN 50133 security classification 2A (now archived) is acceptable. Furthermore, the installation should be compliant with the requirements of BS EN 60839.

Use of an NSI/SSAIB accredited company allows discharge of these requirements should core protection be added to the BREEAM accreditation process. (This would have to be subject to the future approval by the SQSS of any proposed system – the 2A classification requires the system includes destination control provision throughout, together with data logging facilities).

**MANDATORY if full fit out.**

**ADVISORY only if fit out is to Category A standard.**

#### **v) Vehicle entry**

The site will have a single main vehicle access point and then onward access to each of the units. The main access will have a bifold vehicle security gates and a pedestrian gate as well as a security hut to manage access. The gates should be part of any access control system to facilitate legitimate access and to reduce the risk of intrusion and tailgating.

It is essential that the main entry point and access roads are lit according to the lighting specification recommended for a public space (see **Item ix**).

**MANDATORY**

### vi) Refuse/Bin Storage

The refuse/bin storage for each unit /set of units is shown on the plans provided as external to each building envelope but within the curtilage of the site. These are of timber construction and the timber should be protected by a fire retardant coating. Any off the shelf product is acceptable, no specific rating is required.

The bin storage should have a form of access control to avoid unauthorised access and to reduce the risk of arson. The door should include an auto close, auto lock facility. It should also have a means of escape internally to avoid anyone being accidentally trapped.

### ADVISORY

### vii) Cycle Storage

Irrespective of position, racking to be a BREEAM compliant product, Alternative accreditation is a Sold Secure SS104 bronze rated product.

### MANDATORY

Cycle storage is shown for each unit. The majority are internal, however, Unit 1 has an external cycle store to the side of the building.

Cycle storage should reduce the risk of theft of bicycles from bike storage areas by providing suitably robust furniture for staff and visitors to secure bikes.

**External** cycle storage should have a clear line of sight to and from the building or be protected by video surveillance.

External cycle stores will often use the Sheffield stand. To meet the third 'independent locking point' requirement, a Sheffield stand with the strengthening cross strut (tapping rail) should be installed.

**Internal storage** should be integrated into the individual buildings access control system.

If site lighting does not sufficiently illuminate any planned cycle storage (as below), the storage area could be illuminated when motion is sensed – 2 stage lighting is preferred, where a photocell operated low level ambient light is provided with illumination levels increased upon motion detection.

#### **ADVISORY**

##### **viii) Emergency egress doors**

These can be manually or electrically operated. Any manual panic bar must meet either BSEN 179 or BSEN1125. Any electromechanical holding mechanism of any egress door is to withstand a minimum of 600Kg (6kN) of pull resistance prior to failure.

#### **MANDATORY**

##### **ix) Lighting**

The lighting scheme is yet to be finalised.

Irrespective of luminaire type and position, the following must apply.

Lighting, both internal and external, must achieve either ILP or CIBSE levels.

From a Secured by Design perspective, highways or public amenity areas must comply with BS5489:2020. Areas within curtilage must achieve either ILP or CIBSE minimum requirements. In addition, a 15% uniformity should also be specified.

Any lighting review should ensure that it complements any existing or proposed new CCTV system.

#### **MANDATORY**

#### **x) Vehicle Parking Provision**

Each unit has dedicated or shared parking provision for staff and visitors, including electric charging and accessible bays. Parking for service vehicles is within the loading bays and yards. Staff and visitor parking areas should accommodate various vehicle sizes/types and the bays should be clearly marked with safe/additional pedestrian routes identified.

Pedestrian routes to and from the car parking should meet the required lighting requirements (Item ix).

#### **ADVISORY**

#### **xii) Boundary**

The units are shown to have a 2.4 weld mesh perimeter fencing. Gates, both pedestrian and vehicular, are shown to be the same height. The security hut is shown adjacent to gates and this provides excellent security opportunity for the site if routinely managed by security staff.

#### **MANDATORY**

#### **xiii) Manual security**

Those units that have a dedicated reception area would benefit from electronic surveillance (CCTV). A camera which provides identification standard images should be positioned to record visitors within this area.

#### **ADVISORY**

#### **xiv) Electronic Security - CCTV**

Any electronic security system must be installed by a contractor that is registered under the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes.

[www.nsi.org.uk](http://www.nsi.org.uk)

[www.ssaib.org.uk](http://www.ssaib.org.uk)

Where a new CCTV system is to be installed as part of any shell or core fit and is a standalone system, the requirements for this system would be that;

- Devices are securely stored in a landlord only portion of the building.
- The recording device has a means of export.
- Exports have operating software automatically burnt onto the disc or stick.
- Cameras will be of 16CIF quality.
- Complies with a minimum of BS62676 at Grade 2.
- Is registered with the Information Commissioners office, (if required) please refer to ([www.ico.gov.uk](http://www.ico.gov.uk)) to check. Your accredited installer will advise.
- If primary images are to be stored on site, it is recommended a 28-day retention period be designed in. Should primary storage of images be off site, then a 7-day secondary (on site) retention period would be acceptable.

**MANDATORY** – if a video surveillance system is installed as part of the initial fit out.

#### xv) **Intruder Alarm**

If the building is to have an intruder alarm installed as part of the initial build phase, then the system should comply with the requirements of BS EN50131 at a minimum of a Grade 2 system. This again requires installation by an NSI or SSAIB registered company.

**ADVISORY**

The design of the building examined under this assessment shows significant regard for both safety of person and security of property.

Provided all the above mandatory elements are included, I confirm that security credits available under the BREEM scheme could be claimed.

This report has been produced based on all information collated and by way of subsequent correspondence. Should any amendment to the design or build specification be necessary, an SQSS should be notified in order that the security assessment can be modified as required.



KABSEC Consultancy Ltd.

## Other Considerations

### Counter Terrorism

At the time of issue, the threat level for international terrorism in the UK set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was set at **SUBSTANTIAL** <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>, meaning an attack is highly likely.

The proposed project location is considered to be in an area of heightened risk. Counter terror issues have been considered throughout this assessment.

The terrorism threat posed to this development is deemed **low/medium** – whilst it could conceivably be deemed a crowded place at some stage in the future, {under the PALS criteria (publicly accessible locations), risk is minimal.

This report has been produced based on all information collated, including but not restricted to, site drawings, plans and associated documents, personal site visit, environmental visual audit and by way of subsequent correspondence. Should any amendment to the design or build specification be necessary, I should be notified in order that this security assessment can be modified as required.



Director & Principal Consultant


KABSEC Consultancy.

## Appendix A – Crime Data.


### Huddersfield

Neighbourhood Area

January 2024 – figures from Police.uk



Local to the site – low crime



Majority violent & sexual crimes which appear associated with nearby residential areas. Criminal damage, arson and other theft all above national average.


## Data for January 2024

Neighbourhood Area

### Top reported crimes


Most commonly reported crimes during Jan 2024

Violence and sexual offences	593
Public order	123
Other theft	117
Criminal damage and arson	100



## Appendix B – Statistical Data

February 2023 – January 2024



### Crime Types - 12 months data, February 2023 to January 2024

Type	Total	Percentage
Anti-social behaviour	1465	8%
Bicycle theft	76	0.4%
Burglary	732	4%
Criminal damage and arson	1245	6.8%
Drugs	708	3.9%
Other theft	1288	7%
Possession of weapons	208	1.1%
Public order	2186	11.9%
Robbery	140	0.8%
Shoplifting	1076	5.9%
Theft from the person	192	1%
Vehicle crime	675	3.7%
Violence and sexual offences	7874	43%
Other crime	445	2.4%

## Appendix C

### Useful Standards

#### Alarms

BS EN 50131 - 4 grades (to accommodate all EU requirements)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. Low Risk Site                          | (no response achievable – of little value in UK) |
| 2. Standard Domestic/Low Risk Commercial  | (e.g. Florist/Newsagent)                         |
| 3. High Risk Domestic/Standard Commercial | (e.g. IT company/Financial Institution)          |
| 4. High Risk Commercial                   | (e.g. Jewellers)                                 |

BS 6799 - wire free systems

Don't forget the NSI and SSAIB accreditation schemes

[www.nsi.org.uk](http://www.nsi.org.uk)

[www.ssaib.org.uk](http://www.ssaib.org.uk)

Both provide postcode search facility for specific localities.

#### Buildings

Loss Prevention Standard 1175 (LPS 1175 – 8 security ratings)

Intruder Resistance, strong rooms, security grilles, shutters etc.

The security rating system is loosely based upon: -

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| Domestic risk 1 and 2                      | (where 1 is low and 2 is high risk)                 |
| Commercial risk 2, 3 and 4                 | (2, Florist, 3, School, Designer outlet, 4 Chemist) |
| Higher security risks 5 and 6              | (High value Jewellers, Banks, Post Offices)         |
| Extremely high security facilities 7 and 8 | (Bullion sites etc.)                                |

**CCTV**

(NSI and SSAIB accreditation is also applicable for CCTV)

BS 7958	Code of Practice
BS 8495	Export of Digital Images
BS 8418	Remote Monitoring Stations
BS 62676	CCTV/Video Surveillance in security applications

**Doors**

PAS24:2022	Residential. (Door sets to comply with PAS 23-1)
STS 202	
LPS2081	
LPS1175	Commercial

**Fencing**

BS1722	
Part 1 Chain Link	
Part 2 Wire Mesh	
Part 10 Anti intruder fences	
Part 12 Steel Palisade	

LPS 1175	
CPNI Perimeter Security & Access Control Guidance	

**Vehicular Doors**

LPS 1175	SR 1-2
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## Lighting

BS5489:2020 Public Amenity Areas.

Other Areas <https://theilp.org.uk/publication/lighting-against-crime/>

Guidance from either the Institute of Lighting Professionals (ILP) or the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE) are regularly used for lighting schemes.

Subject to illumination and uniformity levels complying with any SQSS minimum requirement, then use of ILP or CIBSE levels are deemed satisfactory for average crime and below average crime locations.

## Locks

Standard	Function	Comments
<b>BS 3621:2007</b> (key egress)	Locked by key from both sides	Provided that the key is removed, this type of lock is secure against operation by intruders reaching through a letter-plate, breaking nearby glazing etc. Best used where emergency escape is not required or where other means of escape exist and where security is paramount.
<b>BS 8621:2007</b> (keyless egress)	Locked by key from outside only; can always be opened from the inside without a key – e.g. via a thumb turn or lever.	This type of lock offers emergency escape without a key at all times. Best used where there is no danger of the inside handle or thumb-turn being operated from the outside by, for instance, breaking a glazed panel, reaching through a letter plate etc. and where safety is critical (e.g. in flats)
<b>BS 10621:2007</b> (dual mode)	Locked by key from outside only; can be opened from inside without a key EXCEPT when this function has been disabled by a positive key operation from the outside.	Combines ease of escape in emergency with an additional security feature for use ONLY when leaving the premises unoccupied. Best used where an alternative means of escape exists. BS 10621 offers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• security <i>and</i> safety</li> <li>• protection of properties when vacant</li> </ul>



**Glass and glazing** (general security requirements – not including effect of blast)

BS EN 356(2000) Anti-bandit security glazing.

Domestic                    BS EN 356 P1A

Commercial                BS EN 356 P1A

LPS 1270                    Security Glazing & Glazing Films

BS 6206                    Toughened Glass

BS EN 12150                Toughened Glass

BS EN 14179                Heat soaked toughened glass

BS EN 14449                Laminated glass

BS EN 12543                Laminated glass

\*This standards section may not incorporate all standards specified.

It is intended to be used purely as an aide memoire – specific standards are included within the main body of the assessment security recommendation section (within the building security requirement section above).


# Appendix D


## Site Information


### Revised Site Plan.





## Plans used to inform the report

 2100 PROPOSED SITE PLAN.pdf


 2000 - Rev.B UNIT 1 PROPOSED PLANS A...


 2000 Rev.F UNIT 1 PROPOSED PLANS AN...


 2001 - UNIT 2 PROPOSED PLANS AND EL...


 2001 Rev.A UNIT 2 PROPOSED PLANS AN...


 2001 UNIT 2 PROPOSED PLANS AND ELE...


 2002 - UNITS 3-4 PROPOSED PLANS AN...


 2002 Rev.E UNIT 3 PROPOSED PLANS AN...


 2003 - UNITS 5-7 PROPOSED PLANS AN...


 2003 Rev.C UNITS 4-6 PROPOSED PLANS ...

 2004 - UNITS 8-9 PROPOSED PLANS AN...


 2004 Rev.C UNITS 7-8 PROPOSED PLANS ...

 2005 - UNITS 10-11 PROPOSED PLANS A...

 2005 Rev.C UNITS 9-10 PROPOSED PLAN...

 2006 - UNITS 12-15 PROPOSED PLANS A...

 2006 Rev.C UNITS 11-14 PROPOSED PLA...

 2010 FENCING PLAN.pdf

## Site Images

Source – Google Maps /Google Earth

Images are limited as Street View is restricted to the main roads near the site.

Towards the proposed site down Blackmoorfoot Road.



Existing site entry and junction to Standard Drive.



Rear of the site looking from Standard Drive



Existing boundary



## Appendix E

### SQSS Credentials

#### Suitably Qualified Security Specialist

An individual achieving 1–3 or all of the following can be considered to be suitably qualified for the purposes of compliance with BREEAM:

- 1. Minimum of three years' experience in a relevant security profession (in the last five years). This experience must clearly demonstrate a practical understanding of factors affecting security in relation to construction and the built environment, relevant to the type and scale of the project being undertaken.*
- 2. Holds a qualification relevant to security.*
- 3. Maintains a full membership to a relevant professional body, institute or certification scheme that has a professional code of conduct, to which members adhere.*
- 4. A specialist registered with a BREEAM recognised third-party licensing or registration scheme for security specialists.*

An SQSS may be any practising security professional (e.g. a private security consultant or advisor, a Police DOCO, CTSA, or an individual associated with the client team), however they must demonstrate that they hold the experience, qualifications and memberships required by the SQSS criteria.

When appointing the SQSS, consideration should be given to the appropriateness of the individual to carry out the task assigned. The SQSS should be able to demonstrate that they have experience dealing with similar projects with equal security levels and similar risk.

**SQSS Credentials for KABSEC Consultancy are shown below:**

The SQSS has been an SBD Consultant for 9 years





Secured by Design  
SBD  
Official Police Security Initiative



# LICENSED CONSULTANT CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that **Kevin Burrows**

holds a **Full Licence**

valid until **25 January 2026**

*G. Ferguson*  
Guy Ferguson  
Chief Executive Officer

Date 26/01/2025 ID Number 222




The licence holder has satisfied the requirements for providing an all aspects of 'Secured by Design' giving guidance and advice at all stages of development from planning through to completion and up to sign off by the police service.

The SQSS has been an SBD Consultant for 9 years



The SQSS is a full member of the Security Institute.



**ProQual Level 5 Diploma in Crime Prevention - Designing Out Crime**

has been awarded to

**Kevin Burrows**

31 / 10 / 2019

An award of ProQual AB Ltd, accredited by Ofqual  
**603/3158/6**

European Qualifications Framework Level 5

Certificate number 167684

Pam Lewis  
Director of Qualifications  
ProQual AB Ltd

**ofqual**  
**REGULATED**  
register.ofqual.gov.uk

ProQual AB Ltd, Company Registration Number: 07464445

The SQSS is qualified to BREEAM NC V6 requirements.

